

BGA TECHNICAL COMMITTEE

TNS 5/6/85

PART 1. AIRWORTHINESS "AGGRO" (Please add to the 1985 Green Pages)

- 1.1 GROB 109B TM 817-10 introduces new Main Undercarriage Beams (undrilled). All aircraft should be modified asap to avoid expensive failures!
- 1.2 GROB 109B TM 817-17 introduces Flight Manual changes dated 16/1/85. Details from UK Agents. Such ammendments are a MANDATORY part of the UK Certificate of Airworthiness, which otherwise becomes invalid.
- 1.3 GROB 109A Failure of the Elevator Drive Tube between fairleads in the rear fuselage. A fatigue failure has been confirmed by Grob. Reported to CAA/LBA. Follow up action awaited.
- 1.4 DG 200 LBA Directive 85-80 introduces Flight Manual ammendments concerning CANOPY JETTISON.
- 1.5 ASTIR CS TM 306-26 require exchange of Air Brake Locking Levers. Details from Agents.
- 1.6 ASW 20/22 LBA AD-85-90 (T/Note 2), requires change of TRIM SPRING. Details from Agents.
- 1.7 ASTIR (JEANS) may apply to other variants. LOWER RUDDER HINGE lack of stiffness and cracks in GRP. Inspect as required (Reported by J A Knowles RAE GC)
- 1.8 ASW19/19B Improved Escape (upward Instrument Binnacle)
ASW20/20L " " " " "
Tech. Notes 20 and 22 introduce the above modification.
ASW19/19B New Canopy frame - improved jettison, T/Note 19 refers. Details from UK Agents.
- 1.9 IS28/M2/M2A Rudder Bar Axle fixing rivet, EO-13 introduces Mandatory Modification.
- 1.10 KA 7 MAIN SPAR/Fuselage attachment fitting. Cracks in welded structure. Inspect as indicated in attached sketch. (Reported by G Jones)
- 1.11 IS28B2 CRACKS ON ROOT Rib and Flap, from corner rivets. (I A Knowles RAE GC). Inspect and repair asap.

/ Contd

TUGS

- 1.12 PA18 (CUBS) FAA AD/85-06-04 introduces Fuel Tank Water Drains and Placarding. Must be incorporated asap.
- 1.13 PA18 (CUBS) Random Power Loss. Reports from several sources have been investigated. Possible causes are:
 - (a) Fuel Tank Vents not allowing adequate supplies of air into the tanks. Fuel Cap Vents may be blocked. (AD/78/10/03 attached applies)
 - (b) Exhaust Muffler becoming obstructed by baffles shifting to block exit.
 - (c) Carb Hot/Cold shutters not operating properly, particularly on to the "cold" stop.
- 1.14 Extracts from General Aviation Safety Information Leaflets
 - (a) MOGAS problems - Auster
 - (b) Blocked Pitot
 - (c) Painting of Aircraft
 - (d) Induction Air Filters (AGAIN!)
 - (e) Ground Loops - (Wheel Tracking)
 - (f) Corrosion. Robin DR400-140
 - (g) Corrosion. Robin 100/210

PART 2. GENERAL MATTERS

- 2.1 PEGASUS modification to incorporate tailwheel and ballast is available from Booker GC.
- 2.2 IS 28 B2 EO-13 increases Safe Life to 10,000 hours or 30,000 landings, subject to inspection.
- 2.3 IS 28 M2 EO-12 increases the Safe Life to 4,000 hours or 25,000 landings, subject to inspection.
- 2.4 DART 17 Belly Hook Modification (Tost Hook) Details available from Tim McFadyn, Cotswold GC. Approved by BGA REF BGA/DART/1/85.
- 2.5 MAX WEAK LINK RATINGS The following list has been derived from Flight Manuals or Type Certificate Data Sheets for WINCH/AUTO-TOW LAUNCHING:

ASW17	1323 lbs	ASTIR (TWIN)	1323 lbs	VENTUS	1433 lbs
ASK13	2350 lbs	ASTIR (G102) CS	1100 lbs		
ASK18	1100 lbs	DG100G	1100 lbs		
ASW20	1320 lbs	JANUS C	1653 lbs		
ASK21	1870 lbs	LS4	1323 lbs		
KA6E	1400 lbs	NIMBUS III	2000 lbs		
CIRRUS	1100 lbs	RHONLERCHE II	2000 lbs		


If you have additional authoritative information on other types, please advise BGA office.

- 2.6 CHIPMUNKS Hoffman Propeller for Glider Towing. Prop: HO-21-208B-108L
is now CAA Approved. Flight Manual Change Sheet makes
the aircraft non-aerobatic. Details from BGA Office.
- 2.7 BEARING LUBRICATION (Ball Races Etc). Grease liberally smeared on
ball races may do no more than accumulate debris, particularly
when applied to caged/sealed types. A drop of oil may
be more effective. Reference should be made to Maintenance
Manuals for correct form of lubrication.
- 2.8 CIRRUS & CIRRUS VTC Flight Manual changes to "c.g. positions & Loading
Plan" are contained in Tech. Note 265-7 dated 16 July 84,
from Southern Sailplanes.
- 2.9 T65 "VEGA" Elevator Mass Balance J A Knowles RAE Gliding Club has
devised a Minor Modification in consultation with SLINGSBY
to add 3 oz of ballast. Should eliminate tendency towards
"Buzz/Flutter". Details from BGA Office.
- 2.10 IMPORTATION OF "USED" TUGS. Before embarking upon the purchase of
second-hand tugs from any source, you are well advised
to check with CAA (Airworthiness Division) that the aircraft
type, in every respect (propeller, powerplant, exhaust
system etc), is in no way modified from standard, and
is of a type already certificated in the UK. Whereas
"quiet" props and exhaust systems are desirable, they
may create prolonged and expensive airworthiness "aggro".
The CTO has made strong recommendations to CAA for the
acceptance of Export Certificates of Airworthiness from
European Countries, for both standard and sensibly modified
types.

R. B. STRATTON


Chief Technical Officer

June 1985.



VIEW LOOKING FT IN REAR COCKPIT

MAIN SPAR / FUSelage ATTACHMENT FITTING



CRACK WAS INITIALLY VISIBLE AS A THIN RUSTY HAIRLINE CRACK IN THE PAINT FILM PAINT WAS REMOVED AND THE AREA CHECKED WITH MAGNAFLUX, CRACK DETECTING MAGNETIC INK SYSTEM.

THE EXTENT OF THE CRACK WAS THEN APPARENT I.E. IT RAN APPROX HALF WAY AROUND THE LOWER EDGE OF THE WELD.

THE CROSS TUBE WAS VERY SLIGHTLY DISHED IN THE AREA OF THE WELD SUGGESTING A LARGE DOWNLOAD AT SOME STAGE, PROBABLY AS A RESULT OF A HEAVY LANDING.

THE CRACK WAS REPAIRED BY REWELDING AND THE AREA REPROTECTED.

OUR OTHER Ka7 WAS CHECKED AND FOUND TO BE CRACK FREE IN THIS AREA.

CRACK RUNNING APPROX 180° AROUND LOWER EDGE OF WELD FROM ONE SIDE TO OTHER.

Gareth Jones 11/1/710

G-A-3-1-L 4/85

TNS | 5/6/85

8. GROUND LOOPS

P/E

Aircraft : Jodel D120

COULD APPLY TO CONDORAS?

The following letter appeared in Flight on 16 March 1985.

I operate, with a partner, a Jodel D120. When we acquired this aircraft, some 2½ years ago, it had an extreme tendency to swing violently on landing. Furthermore, it was very difficult to push backwards when being manoeuvred around in its hangar. These problems were traced to excessive toe-in of the main wheels, which was also evidenced by uneven tyre wear.

Realignment of the main wheels to minimise the toe-in has completely cured these problems. The aircraft is now docile in the extreme when landing, giving us cause to wonder whether the widely held view that Jodels are prone to ground-looping

reflects the likelihood that a significant number of aircraft are suffering from the same defect.
DR R. V. SMITH
Stony End
Long Load
Nr Langport
Somerset

CAA Comment:

It is considered that 'toe-in' with a tail gear is strongly de-stabilising, the main gear should ideally be 'toed-out' by 1 to 2°. The Maintenance Manual does not contain any information on alignment or adjustment. The effect of heavy, or many normal landings over the years would tend to produce 'toe-in'.

The SDAU data base has 16 accidents since 1976 in Jodel aircraft involving loss of control on the ground. We do not have a record of the nasty frights or damage-free ground loops.

9. CORROSION IN WINGS

P/E

Aircraft : Robin DR400-140
Date : February 1985

During repairs after an accident, the forward fuel tank support sections were found to be severely corroded and deformed. The type of corrosion was intercrystalline. The left-hand main wing strengthening strap also showed the same indications in a number of places, and had lost about 5% in thickness and 2% in width from new when blended out. The reporter believes that the corrosion had been seen previously but painted over. The aircraft had flown about 1000 hours.

10.

E

Aircraft : Robin 100/210
Date : February 1985

During the annual inspection exfoliation corrosion was found on the right-hand and centre wing lower spar boom angles. Corrosion was also found on the left-hand wing/fuselage attachment angles and the forward ends of the lower main fuselage aft longerons. Additionally, further signs of corrosion could be seen through the primer finish over large areas of the remaining spar angles.

The reporter states that corrosion has appeared in the last 18 months since the spars were inspected in accordance with CAA AD 006-05-83 in August, 1983 and a repair to the left hand wing was carried out at that time.

CAA Comment:

This known problem, which we have reported before, has resulted in CAA AD 006-05-83. Other references are LTO 9/97/CTAW/165A and Robin S/B 19. See also GASIL 5/84 item 12.

GASIL 5/85.

2. FUEL FILLER CAP ADAPTOR DETACHED

P/E

Aircraft : Gulfstream American AA5
Date : March 1985

During the pre-flight inspection it was found that the left hand fuel tank filler cap adaptor had become detached from the tank. The adaptor is bonded to the top of the tank, the bond had failed, the adaptor being held in place by the adaptor scupper drain pipe which passes through the tank. The adaptor is being re-installed using countersunk screws and PRC cement. The aircraft had flown 1290 hours. The right-hand wing adaptor was found to be securely bonded.

CAA AD 0527 PRE 78 and CAA letter 9/92/LTO/4 refer to bonding but do not refer to fuel tank components.

SUMMERTIME PROBLEMS

3. Mogas problem on a hot day

P

Aircraft : Auster J1 Autocrat
Date : July 1984
Engine : Blackburn Cirrus Minor

Prior to take-off the taxiing time was kept fairly short, and although the engine briefly hiccupped on opening the throttle, the take-off and initial climb were uneventful. At 1000ft on the downwind leg the engine coughed and died. Moving the throttle caused the engine to produce some power before dying again. A successful forced landing was made on the aerodrome. On the ground the engine ran normally. The aircraft was using Mogas, the OAT at the time of take-off being 27°C, after the aircraft had been standing in the sun all day. The circumstances before take-off prevented a comprehensive power check. After cooling down and topping up with 100LL fuel, a normal departure was made two hours later.

The previous owner had also experienced some problems on hot days when using Mogas.

CAA Comment:

This is the first case known to us of the problem on an Auster, in spite of many Austers which use Mogas. It is not known if there is anything different about the fuel system (leading to a hot spot) on this individual aircraft when compared with other Austers. It may be that the tank fuel temperature was above the 20°C limitation imposed by Airworthiness Notice No 98. We would welcome any information from Auster owners and other users of Mogas about their experience to date. See also Safety Sense Leaflet No 4, Mogas, included with this issue.

4. Beetle Blocked Pitot

P

Aircraft : Cessna 172
Date : July 1984

After spending the day at Beauvais the pilot took off for Guernsey. The ASI failed to read on take-off, but after 30 minutes or so the ASI started to indicate about 20 kts slow. The weather was good and the journey was continued. The ASI indicated 40-50 kts on the approach. The cause was a mudfly beetle in the pitot tube.

The reporter stated that other cases had occurred during the hot weather.

CAA Comment:

A number of cases were reported during the long hot summer of 1976. This resulted in the issue of an AIC (no longer current) to remind pilots of the advisability of pitot and static covers fitted with proper flag or other alerting devices to prevent them being overlooked before flight.

13. PAINTING OF AIRCRAFT

BASIL 5/85.

E

Incidents continue to be reported which are a direct result of aircraft painting processes.

Airworthiness Notice No.12, Appendix No.22, highlights the damage and potential hazards associated with these processes. In addition to this the CAA wishes to reiterate the fact that certain activities resulting from painting processes require certification by appropriately Licensed Aircraft Engineers or Organisations approved for such work, e.g.

- removal of control surfaces for balancing
- inspection for contamination of bearings and seals
- blockage of pitot/static and fuel vent orifices
- obliteration of exterior markings and placards
- effect on protective treatments
- the need to reweigh the aircraft
- coverage of radio/nav aerals etc.

In other words all inspections that are required to return the aircraft to service.

14. FAA AD ON PAPER INDUCTION AIR FILTERS

E

In order to prevent possible engine power loss or stoppage caused by engine ingestion of fragments of deteriorated induction air filter FAA AD 84-26-02 became effective from 29 January 1985.

Within the next 100 hours service time after the effective date of the AD or prior to the accumulation of 500 hours in service on the filter, whichever occurs later and thereafter at intervals not exceeding 500 hours on the filter.

- (a) Replace the filter with a new filter that is FAA approved for the aircraft installation.
- (b) Within 100 hours service replace any filter on which the time in service cannot be determined from the aircraft maintenance records.

Note: This AD does not alter current maintenance procedures which require inspection of paper induction air filters at 100 hours time in service and annual inspection and replacements as necessary based on filter conditions.

CAA Comment:

LAMS Section 7 Item 32 requires inspection at 50, 150 and Annual intervals. Also Appendix 31 to Airworthiness Notice No. 12 was published very recently to emphasise the need for the effective inspection and cleaning of air intake filters as a result of engine power loss or stoppage to engines in UK registered aircraft. The FAA AD specifically applies to paper air filters used in small aircraft and is mandatory for UK registered aircraft where applicable. However, it is important that all air intake filters irrespective of type are inspected, cleaned and/or replaced at sufficiently frequent intervals to maintain their effectiveness and integrity.

15. CHART LIGHT SHORTED


E

Aircraft : Cessna 441 Conquest (also applicable to C421 and 425)
Date : February 1985

When the left-hand chart light in the cockpit roof panel was moved the circuit breaker on panel 'R' tripped out. It was found that the lights' positive terminal had shorted against the mounting plate assy (P/N 5119166-1).


Repositioning of the light within its aperture is not possible due to the proximity of the cockpit roof fuselage skin, so to overcome the problem the mounting plate is to be dressed out and an insulating sleeve applied to the light terminal. The aircraft had flown 895 hours.

PIPER CUB. CORRECT FUEL CAP!!



CROSS SECTION OF FUEL TANK INLET AND RUBBER SEAL
SKETCH 1
78-10-03

DRILL .098" HOLES x 2.



CAUTION
DO NOT DRILL THRU
THIS SURFACE

SKETCH 2
AD 78-10-03

PIPER PA-18 CUB.

Fuel Tank VENTS.

PIPER PART NO. 15296-02

Piper Service Bulletins 573.

TNS 15/6/85

No: 4/85

Ref: EW/G85/03/01

Aircraft type and registration: Socata MS 893A Rallye Commodore 180 G-AVAK (light single engine fixed wing aircraft)

Year of Manufacture: 1967

Date and time (GMT): 6 March 1985 at 1037 hrs

Location: Buttergask Farm, Nr Perth, Scotland

Type of flight: Private (pleasure)

Persons on board: Crew — 1 Passengers — 2

Injuries: Crew — None Passengers — None

Nature of damage: Undercarriage lost on impact, underside of fuselage, and wings extensively damaged

Commander's Licence: Private Pilot's Licence

Commander's Age: 40 years

Commander's total flying experience: 150 hours (of which 90 were on type)

Information Source: Aircraft Accident Report Form submitted by the pilot.

Shortly after beginning a flight from Perth to Kirkwall (whilst at 2300 ft QNH), there was a sudden onset of severe vibration. The pilot immediately initiated an engine-off forced landing, at the same time making a 'Mayday' call.

The airspeed was reduced to a minimum in the hope of stopping the propeller. After selecting 10° of flap, the battery master switch was moved to the 'off' position, the fuel was selected to 'off', and a forced-landing field chosen.

Because of overhead power lines the landing took place in a field beyond this one. The aircraft touched down with a low forward speed and came to rest after 10 to 15 yards, the undercarriage having separated at impact. All three occupants evacuated the aircraft immediately.

Inspection of the aircraft revealed that a section of one propeller blade tip, approximately 5 inches long, had separated in flight.

BGA NOTE. CAA Notice No 55 refers.

Daily inspection is advised where stone damage is probable.

B.G.A. TNS 5/6/84 NOTICE BOARD

MOGAS OPERATION (C.A.A. NOTICE No. 98)

"HOT" OPERATION PRECAUTIONS

There is increasing evidence that recent deliveries of Mogas contain more volatile elements of propane etc., which may create rich mixture situations on start-up and pre-take-off, after "hot soaking".

C.A.A. Notice No.98 (Issue 4 April 1984), gives the following guidance, which should be brought to the attention of all operators of tugs and motor gliders.

"After any prolonged period of "heat soak" at low fuel flow (e.g. hot-day ground idling) establish the availability of full power before commencing take-off."

B.G.A. Note

This precaution applies particularly (but not exclusively) to aircraft fitted with engine driven fuel pumps. (Lycoming engines are more susceptible because of the rear mounted fuel pumps, and because the carb is bolted to the engine sump).


The pre-take-off power check should be prolonged enough to clear "hot" fuel out of the entire powerplant system.

JUNE 1984

B.G.A. TNS 5/6/84

TNS/5/6/85.

PROPELLER BLADE FAILURES.



Fuji Prop Blade

17. Complete Blade Lost

P/E

Aircraft: Cessna C206 (possibly applicable to other aircraft)

The following was published in Australian Airworthiness Advisory Circular February 1985.

One propeller blade separated from the hub during flight because of hub cracking. Fatigue cracks had propagated from several sites in the 6th thread. One of the other blades was also cracked at this thread. Poor shot peening of the roots was noted. It was thought to be a strong possibility that the crack was visible at the outer surface of the hub at the 100 hour inspection done 30 hours previously. However, the presence of a self-adhesive decal fixed to the hub may have hindered detection. The propeller had flown 4987 hours with 1363 since overhaul. The propeller was a McCauley D3A32C-90-CM.

18. Part of Blade lost, Very Severe Vibration

P/E

Aircraft: Rallye MS 893A Registration G-AVAK
 Date: March 1985
 Reportable Accident near Perth, Scotland

When levelling off at 2,300 ft after take-off there was a sudden violent vibration from the front of the aircraft. The pilot set the power to idle but the vibration level was still severe until speed was reduced to the stall to stop the propeller. After making a MAYDAY call, completing checks, etc, a forced landing was made in a ploughed field. When flying at the correct gliding speed vibration returned and it was necessary to reduce speed further. The aircraft was badly damaged but the three occupants were uninjured.

About 5" of one blade of the propeller tip was missing. The propeller was a Sensenich 76 EMS/0/60. The aircraft had flown 1076 hours. The propeller history is unknown.

19. NEW AERODROME TRAFFIC ZONE RULES

P

An Aerodrome Traffic Zone (ATZ) is defined as a shape 1 1/2 nm from the aerodrome boundary extending 2000 ft above the aerodrome surface. As from 26 April 1985 (see AIC 21/1985 and NOTAM A271/1985) the following aerodromes will be the only ones to have the protection of an ATZ subject to Rule 35 which requires that pilots must obtain permission from the Air Traffic Control Unit to take off, land or fly within the ATZ, or, if there is no ATC Unit, must obtain information from an Aerodrome Flight Information Service or Air/Ground Service to enable flight within ATZ to be conducted with safety.

Aerodrome	Hours	Listed in
Government Aerodromes	at all times	Notan A303/1985 (to be added to AGA 5-1)
An aerodrome having an air traffic control unit or an aerodrome flight information unit	Notified hours of watch	UK Air Pilot AGA 5-1
A licensed aerodrome having two-way radio communication with aircraft	Notified hours of watch	UK Air pilot AGA 5-1

Aerodromes which no longer have an ATZ for the purposes of Rule 35 including those operating outside published hours, will remain protected by the collision avoidance rules of Rule 17 (which used to be part of Rule 35). For overflying aircraft a requirement is now placed on an aircraft commander flying in the vicinity of an aerodrome (previously 'within an ATZ'), to conform to the traffic pattern or keep clear. This rule is applicable to all aerodromes whether or not they have an ATZ.

Aeronautical charts will be amended as they are raised in issue to show those aerodromes which have an ATZ.

Pilots are reminded of the existence of detailed notes at the bottom of each chart relating to aerodrome status.

20. CRACKED ELEVATOR MASS BALANCE RIB

E

Aircraft: Piper PA31 Navajo
Date: April 1985

A crack was found in the left hand side elevator control surface mass balance rib running forward from the hinge. The aircraft was manufactured in 1973.

CAA Comment:

This is the only case known to us on this aircraft type.

21. CRACKED ELEVATOR ACTUATING ARMS

E

Aircraft: Cessna 337G (Foreign Registered)
Date: February 1985

During a scheduled inspection both the left and right hand elevator actuating arms (Part Nos 1532 009-203 and 204) were found to be cracked at the inner face of the attachment. The cracks originated at the large side of the conic bore for the AN 386-2-14A pin and extended outward.

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
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1.12.

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BLANK

Fig. 20. Elevator control

- 1) Front control stick; 2) Spring; 3) Tubular bridge with mounted control sticks; 4) Rear control stick; 5) Push-pull rods; 6) Double-arm lever; 7) Bolt; 8) Turnbuckle; 9) Control cables; 10) Double-arm lever; 11) Bolt; 12) Push-pull rods; 13) Elevator actuation; 14) Elevator; 15) Push rod connecting front and rear control stick; 16) Carriers.

Blank Elevator Drive.

BCA TNS/7/8/85

BRITISH GLIDING ASSOCIATION

M E M O R A N D U M

AIRWORTHINESS QUALITY ASSURANCE

1. The Chairman of the Technical Committee and the CTO have reviewed the queries raised by the BGA Executive who may not be aware of the guidelines published in BGA Technical Procedure Manual, a document compiled by the CTO, and accepted by the CAA (Airworthiness Division) as the basis for their delegation to the BGA of Design and Inspection Approval (Ref DAI/8378/73), in respect of motor gliders.
2. These guidelines apply equally to the quality assurance of gliders.
3. The only other recreational organisation to whom the CAA have delegated Design and Inspection Approval is the PFA (Popular Flying Association). The BGA are unique in providing Insurance Indemnity.

INSPECTION RATINGS

4. a) "Ordinary" Inspectors may recommend the renewal of Certificates of Airworthiness of all types of glider and motor-glider airframes, which will have been inspected and recorded on BGA Form 267.
- b) An "E" (Engine) Rating is required for the inspection of motor-glider engines, and includes "top overhaul" capability.
- c) An "M" (Metal) Rating is required for repair of metal gliders, for which specialist equipment and workshop capability is also required.
- d) "Senior" Ratings are issued to those who have not only acquired the skills, but also have the workshop capability for the "major" repair of gliders, and meets the confidence requirements of the Insurance Assessors.

Some people who qualify for "Senior" ratings will have attended manufacturer's courses in Germany (Grob etc.). Others will have acquired their skills "on the job" with other experienced repairers. There are no suitable courses in the UK for major GRP repair.

BGA SYLLABUS

5. The BGA Application Form includes a detailed syllabus, with references to appropriate technical manuals. There is no longer therefore any excuse for "non-standard" repair procedures. In particular, in respect of GRP repairs, whether major or cosmetic, the Flight and Maintenance Manuals required by ICAO are now supplied with each glider, and contain comprehensive instructions on repair procedures.

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RENEWALS

6. Neither the CAA, nor the PFA, nor the BGA have found it either necessary or practical to re-examine applicants on renewal. Each organisation quality assures its airworthiness operations by monitoring cases, and investigating criticisms. (The BGA have some 300 Inspectors.)

CHECKS

7. The CTO visits each Club every 2 years (some more frequently) and motors of the order of 16,000 miles per year. Repair organisations are likewise "monitored" and are also checked by the Insurance Assessors, who place major repair work with them. The quality assurance of such work (whether it be inspection for C of A renewal, or repair), is often the subject of further scrutiny, when the glider is taken to another BGA Inspector for work to be done, and reports are fed back to the BGA.

COMPLAINTS

8. The BGA Technical Committee decline to investigate non-specific and undocumented complaints. (Likewise the CAA and PFA.) Almost all documented complaints have some element of "commercial" disagreement as a background. It is exceptional to receive more than one documented complaint in a year!

CONCLUSION

9. The objective is unique in that we are tasked to maintain standards of airworthiness throughout some 100 or more clubs, locations or repair stations, in respect of some 1,500 gliders and 50 odd motor gliders, with minimal bureaucracy, minimal (staff) man-power, and in the context of interpreting airworthiness requirements and regulations in the most liberal fashion.

10. The interpretation of the term "airworthiness" in itself generates many different points of view! We are lucky to have so few cases of significant conflict.

11. In more than twenty years as a member of the BGA Technical Committee, only two BGA Inspector privileges have been withdrawn.

12. , Whereas there is never a case for complacency, the Technical Committee are not dissatisfied with the track record that has been demonstrated in the unique environment of mostly amateurs (in the aeronautical engineering sense), self regulating their own airworthiness affairs.



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R. B. STRATTON
Chief Technical Officer

29 July 1985